Clinical ethics services are increasingly receiving case referrals regarding requests for access to experimental therapies.
Introduction
An experimental or 'unproven' therapy is one whose safety and efficacy is still being tested. Experimental therapies can be in the early stages of development, with almost no evidence base for their safety or efficacy, or in later stages of development, with established safety and emerging efficacy. By contrast, a proven therapy has an established evidence base that indicates medical benefit and related approval from local drug or device authorities. Participants in a clinical trial testing an experimental therapy receive that therapy for free. This sometimes includes compassionate provision for patients who have responded well to the therapy, where the therapy continues to be provided to participants for a period of time following the conclusion of the trial but before the relevant drug authority grants approval or subsidises the therapy. Some drug manufacturers also set up an expanded access program (EAP), which allows them, under specific conditions, to distribute an experimental therapy that is not the local standard of care outside of a clinical trial with the intent to therapeutically benefit recipients. 1 The company manufacturing a therapy or the public healthcare system might cover part or all of the cost of a therapy, or consumers might pay privately for it. 2 Sometimes, patients and families request access to a promising experimental therapy that is not subsidised by any government scheme, for which no local clinical trials are underway, or for which they cannot gain free or compassionate access. 3 These cases are difficult precisely because they arise in the ambiguous space between a therapy being experimental and it being treatment. In this paper, I will address the question of whether it is ethically permissible for a public hospital to administer a self-funded, promising experimental therapy to only one patient, when other patients with the same condition at the same hospital will not receive the therapy because they cannot afford it. While I use a paediatric case to illustrate this problem, my argument is also applicable to cases involving adult patients.
I propose a way for clinicians and clinical ethics committees (CECs) to approach requests for promising experimental therapies that may help them to balance the notion of benefit to one child with a desire to treat patients fairly or equitably. I examine the use of the 'levelling down objection' and Pareto principles in ethical deliberation about patient-or family-initiated requests for experimental therapies. While facilitating access to an experimental therapy might benefit one patient without making any other patients worse off, appealing to Pareto-improvements or the levelling down objection alone may not dispel ethical concerns regarding equity that clinicians and clinical ethicists experience. I will defend the claim that inequity in access to experimental therapies can be ethically permissible, where it satisfies two conditions: firstly, the decision to provide one patient and not others with a promising experimental therapy based on their family's ability to pay must make a 'move towards equity'; and secondly, the inequity must be exercised in a way that shows respect for other patients who are not able to access the experimental therapy. I explain and defend these two conditions in the penultimate section of this paper. In the following section of this paper, I provide some background about the role of justice and equity in public healthcare. In a further section, I provide a brief outline of some strengths and weakness of utilising the levelling-down objection and Pareto principles in medical decision-making.
Justice and equity in public healthcare
Justice is a well-established and widely endorsed value in health ethics. In public healthcare, justice is often weighed alongside other values and principles such as beneficence, non-maleficence, autonomy, respect for persons, trust and transparency. [4] [5] [6] Justice is often thought to encompass addressing avoidable or resolvable disparities in the health opportunities and outcomes of persons. [7] [8] [9] Put differently, one of the central tenets of public healthcare is to treat patients as equitably as possible. Healthcare professionals working in public institutions have a professional obligation or commitment to equity that private practitioners do not necessarily have.
Public and private healthcare systems differ in several ways. In public systems, different healthcare services and therapies are assessed and funded based on need, efficacy, and efficiency, with need and fairness generally considered to be integral to public healthcare. Private practice follows a more consumerist model of healthcare delivery, that is, follows the idea that patients are consumers and healthcare goods and services should be provided to them on the basis of demand and purchasing power. Public healthcare systems and healthcare professionals working within them have a duty to promote equity and consider values beyond a net increase in medical utility or profit-driven, consumerist goals. A net increase in medical utility in isolated cases could result in the perpetuation of ongoing inequities that actually detract from utility in the long run. Healthcare practitioners working in the public sector have a duty to consider patients and resources not just in isolation but also in the context of the broader system. Without this duty, it becomes difficult to identify what distinguishes public from private medical practice. As previously stated, public healthcare generally allocates resources according to need and fairness -the claim that public systems and practitioners do not have a duty to promote equity seems incompatible with the foundational values and aims of public healthcare. The purpose of this paper is not to convince readers that clinicians working in the public sector have a professional duty to treat patients equitably-it is beyond the scope of this paper to do so. The argument presented in this paper is conditional: if clinicians or members of a CEC in a public hospital feel that they have a duty to treat patients equitably, as many do, then what I propose is a way forward that might help them to balance their commitment to beneficence with their commitment to justice.
Clinicians and CECs might adopt one of two default positions in cases like the one outlined above: T should be provided unless there is a good reason not to do so, or, T should not be provided without a good reason to do so. If administering an experimental therapy to one patient causes no significant, immediate harm to other patients, and is likely to benefit that patient, one might ask why the hospital should not administer the therapy. All else being equal, Adam receiving T seems to entail some benefit to him without worsening the position of any other patient-Beth remains in the same position regardless of whether Adam receives T. Stated differently, the argue goes that providing Adam with T does not make anyone worse off and makes at least one person, Adam, better off. 10 In economics, this is what is referred to as a Pareto-improvement. In the above case, Adam stands to benefit from receiving T in two ways: therapeutic benefit and benefit in the sense of having an opportunity or choice, or being able to exercise a privilege, that other patients do not. Despite the benefit to Adam, in the context of public healthcare systems, treating only one patient with a therapy, when others might also benefit from it, evokes a troubling sense of inequity.
If T is beneficial enough for doctors to want to administer it to one child, then it appears that T ought to be provided to all other children with the same condition who are also under their care. That is, though not always locally subsidised, promising experimental agents sometimes appear to constitute a desirable, if not the best, form of treatment for those with a given condition. 11 A widely accepted ethical tenet of paediatric care is that, 'Any treatment for an infant or child should be considered ethically obligatory if, compared with other options, it is significantly more likely to prevent death or serious morbidity, the anticipated benefits to the patient clearly outweigh the burdens, and the treatment is feasible'.
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Levelling-down and Pareto principles in healthcare Attempts to justify inequitable treatment of patients, in the context of requests for self-funded, promising experimental therapies, might take one of the following two forms: appeals to the levelling down objection or appeals to Paretian principles. 13 A Pareto-improvement is a reallocation of a resource such that under the new distribution at least one person is made better off, and no one is made worse off. A distribution or policy is considered Pareto-efficient or Pareto-optimal if no further Paretoimprovements can be made with respect to a given resource.
14 Pareto and related maximin principles are economic principles, though they are applicable to decision-making more generally. 15 There are some existing accounts in the bioethical literature that explicitly examine the application of Paretian principles to decision-making in healthcare. 16 These accounts focus on utilising Pareto principles and the levelling-down objection in macro-level healthcare resource allocation. In this section, I will address each of these in turn, focusing on the use of these principles to justify treatment decisions for particular children.
Broadly construed, levelling down refers to a redistribution of resources that takes something away from someone, making them worse off, in order to eliminate inequality (or achieve equality). The levelling-down objection holds that it is wrong to do so where this new, more egalitarian distribution would be worse for some and better for none. 17 Appeals to Pareto principles are sometimes grounded in the levelling down objection. Preventing an ex ante (predicted) Paretoimprovement on the grounds that not every other, relevant party is also made better off by a particular decision, can be seen as asking the party or parties who would benefit from the Pareto-improvement to 'level down', that is, to sacrifice benefits for the sake of equality where no one is made better off under the new distribution. Denying one party expected benefits on the grounds that not all relevant parties can access those same benefits involves an appeal to absolute or strict equality that is difficult to justify. In the above case, this line of reasoning would run that preventing Adam from accessing T would make him worse off without actually making Beth or any other patients better off.
However, preventing one patient from accessing benefits in these cases does not necessarily constitute levelling down, in the sense intended by the levelling down objection. In the case outlined above, Adam is not being asked to give anything up. Rather, he is not being provided with additional medical benefits on top of what he already has access to. This is not equivalent with resources being reallocated in such a way that something is taken away from those who are better off-in this case Adam and his family-for the sake of a more equal distribution of resources. Even if Adam is denied access to T, he still receives the local standard of care. This is relevant to whether or not the levelling down objection applies in this context. Adam and his parents would be levelling down if they already had T in their possession, and it was forcibly removed from them in the name of equity or equality, but, in this case, Adam and his parents are simply not levelling up.
It becomes clearer that these are not cases of levelling down when the therapy in question is still in the early stages of clinical trials, since in these circumstances the safety and efficacy of the therapy often have not been established and there is no guarantee that any medical benefits will result from administering that therapy. Gibbard 18 contends that as the benefits of something-for example, the efficacy of T-become less certain, the usefulness (and, by extension, ethical force) of appealing to simpler forms of the Pareto principle diminishes. If the therapy in question is in the early stages of trials, and safety and efficacy have not been established, clinicians and CECs should avoid relying on a sense of guaranteed therapeutic benefit to one patient to justify the inequitable treatment of patients. The strength of an appeal to Pareto principles will depend in part upon the evidence base for the therapy in question; as a therapy's evidence base becomes more questionable, the strength of appealing to this sense of making one person being better off and no one worse off diminishes, as it is no longer clear that anyone will benefit from receiving the therapy.
These cases are complicated by the fact that the sense of benefit in question is partly tracking opportunity. The individual in question is being denied the opportunity to access something that may be beneficial; there is a sense that an opportunity to benefit has been taken away from someone, or that they are being denied a choice, and that this, like directly denying someone a material or basic good, is unjustified, problematic, or levelling-down. Denying Adam access to T could be construed as analogous to preventing Jane from buying a nice house in a good neighbourhood because Peter can only afford to live in a two-bit housing development in the bad part of town, or with preventing Timmy from attending a private school because Johnny can only afford a public education. I will offer several responses to this line of thought.
Firstly, health is a different kind of good than an expensive house or private education. Health is essential to the development and flourishing of persons. This is particularly true for children. While shelter and an education are also essential to development and flourishing, an expensive house and a private education are not essential to this. The above analogies overlook the ways in which denying a child essential (life-saving) or beneficial but non-essential treatment or care, and consequently impacting their health and future flourishing, might differ from denying them essential or non-essential material or educational goods. Secondly, these comparisons overlook the professional obligation to treat patients equitably that healthcare professionals working in public healthcare systems have, discussed in previous section. Professionals working in the public housing or public education systems have a similar obligation to treat their clientele or students equitably.
For the above analogy to accurately reflect the case posed at the start of this paper, Jane would have to go to a public housing developer and ask them to, on the same block as their other projects, build her a nice house, or Timmy would have to enrol in a public school and then request additional benefits or resources not available to the other students. Thirdly, this line of reasoning involves an inconsistency. Adam not being able to exercise this opportunity or choice, or receive the benefits associated with T is seen as problematic or unfair. But Beth and other, less well-off children not being able to exercise the same opportunity or choice, or receive the benefits associated with T, is seen as par for the course. Finally, even if one accepts that denying one child opportunity to benefit or choice is levelling down, the approach to ethically evaluating these kinds of cases that I propose in the following section does not involve any child being denied benefits for the sake of equality, so this objection is rendered moot.
Where there is a growing evidence base for a therapy's safety and efficacy, parties involved in a treatment decision may appeal to Paretian principles to defend the inequitable treatment of patients. Used as an ethical justification for the inequitable treatment of patients, Paretian reasoning follows a consequentialist calculus. The literature on the ethical implications of Paretian approaches to resource allocation notes its similarity to consequentialist reasoning. Like a consequentialist approach, the Paretian approach to cases like Adam and Beth's is committed to the claim that a decision resulting in an increase in utility is the ethically preferable (or obligatory) choice. Providing Adam with T arguably constitutes such an increase in utility; Adam is made better off and no one appears to be made immediately worse off by the decision. Bommier and Zuber 19 note that, like consequentialist reasoning, Paretian principles assume neutral or equal degrees of inequality aversion that do not fit with the moral intuitions of many people, that is, they assume that everyone agrees that any degree of inequality is acceptable as long as utility is maximised. The clinicians or team making the decision about whether to provide an experimental therapy to one child but not others, who might also benefit from the therapy but who cannot afford it, may have differing degrees of inequality aversion. That is, some members of the team involved in the decision may find the resulting inequity more morally and professionally reprehensible than other members of the team, and it may consequently be difficult to reach a resolution in a clinical ethics consultation or committee meeting. A strictly Paretian or consequentialist approach to ethical deliberation about this kind of issue leaves little room for divergent views regarding what constitutes an acceptable degree of inequality, or for decisions that are not based on the promotion of maximising utility or expected benefits. Many clinicians and clinical ethicists, particularly those working in the public system, may feel that the degree of inequity involved in a decision is a more weighty or relevant consideration than a strictly Paretian or consequentialist approach allows for.
Considering the ethical viability of Paretian principles in the context of directed donation illustrates some of the problems associated with their application to requests for access to experimental therapies. Veatch 20 and Wilkinson 21 argue that directed donation-where the person donating an organ will only do so if that organ goes to a certain person or kind of person-makes the recipient of that organ better off without worsening the position of anyone else (as those on the wait-list for an organ stay in the same place on the list and would otherwise not receive the directed organ anyway) and can therefore be ethically justifiable. However, both Veatch and Wilkinson fail to take seriously how this kind of decision-making can overlook the ways that decisions which appear just in isolation can reinforce social and systemic attitudes or systems that are unjust, discriminatory or harmful. Allowing an individual to donate an organ on the condition that the organ is only provided to a white person, for example, arguably perpetuates racist attitudes. Mishan 22 writes, '[There] is much that might increase total utility, or that might realise Pareto improvements, that is nonetheless quite unacceptable to civilized societies and can, therefore, become no part of their agenda'. Clinicians and CECs in public institutions may feel that equity is a value that should be weighed alongside their commitment to maximising benefits to patients, and not a value that is necessarily subordinate to Paretian or consequentialist reasoning.
If a public hospital sets the precedent of administering beneficial experimental therapies to some patients and not others, without attempting to address the related inequity, it risks compounding existing inequities and inequalities regarding access to healthcare and related health outcomes for different socioeconomic groups. In choosing to administer T to Adam but not Beth, the hospital violates what Chang 23 calls horizontal equity, that is, the equal treatment of equals or provision of equal treatment to equals by the same authority. In the case of Adam and Beth, healthcare professionals, the hospital executives and those in charge of resource allocation at a political level are all forms of authorities with decision-making power. It is not necessarily true that no one is made worse off by the decision to provide only Adam with T. While no significant, immediate harm is caused to other patients, the privileging of one patient over others may still disadvantage others in both the short and long-term. Some distributions (or redistributions) of a resource improve the standing of some at the same time as moving society towards a more egalitarian state. 24 Strictly Paretian approaches to medical decision-making risk overlooking the importance of balancing improving the status of individuals, in isolation, with correcting for inequities in the broader system. The sense of inequality or inequity generated by the hospital sourcing T for Adam seems to stem more from broader systemic problems concerning resource scarcity and differences in the means available to affected parties -both of which are outside the control of individual clinicians. However, it does not follow from these factors being out of the control of individual clinicians that it is therefore ethically justified for public healthcare institutions to therefore ignore considerations pertaining to equity when it comes to access to therapies. Despite this, it may be the case that inequitable treatment of Adam and Beth can be justified on the grounds that, in the context of paediatric medical decision-making, absolute or strict equality, where one child is denied benefits in the name of equity, seems to involve '[Sacrificing] the well-being of real children on the altar of . . . noble aspirations'. 25 A commitment to equity renders two options: choose to deny one child treatment (and any related benefits) whilst seeking to address the underlying inequity through advocacy and related measures, or choose to allow one child to access the therapy (and reap related benefits) whilst seeking to address the underlying inequity through advocacy and related measures.
It is not clear that denying one child treatment will do anything to address the underlying issue, that is, a policy of strict equality does not seem to benefit anybody. Furthermore, a policy of denying one patient treatment on the grounds of inequity could quickly lead to no patients receiving any form of treatment until everyone can receive the treatment they need. However, choosing not to deny any child benefits whilst, at the same time, seeking to address the inequity such that all children in one's care are and can be treated fairly moving forward is ethically preferable to choosing to benefit only one patient. It is important to consider whether a case like Adam and Beth's present an opportunity for public hospitals and healthcare professionals to contribute to future equity.
Future equity and respect for persons
In order to resolve tension between balancing benefit to some against equitable access to experimental therapies, I propose that inequitable access to promising experimental therapies can be ethically permissible where it satisfies two conditions: firstly, the inequitable treatment must involve healthcare professionals and the hospital executive advocating for future equity, and secondly, the inequitable decision must be exercised in a way that demonstrates respect for affected parties. In this section, I will explain and defend these two conditions. These conditions are intended to serve as guiding measures for clinicians and CECs when faced with cases involving requests for promising experimental therapies that are not equally accessible to other patients.
The first condition that must be met in order for medical inequity to be ethically permissible is that showing one patient special treatment must contribute to future equity, or involve what I will call a 'move towards equity'. Central to satisfying this first criterion for ethically permissible inequity in access to experimental therapies is advocacy. Patient advocacy is a widely accepted duty of healthcare professionals in many jurisdictions. 26, 27 Advocacy might take the form of individual or collective efforts at local or global levels. Through advocacy, clinicians and hospitals may be able to influence therapy-relative inequity or offset inequity in one area with advocacy in others.
In the case above, providing Adam with T could be an opportunity to improve the position of others. The hospital could choose to administer T to Adam if and only if the company conducting the research on T agrees to: (1) expand their qualification criteria so that other potential beneficiaries, such as Beth, can be enrolled in these studies, or (2) set up an EAP for T. Each of these involves advocating for patients who cannot currently afford or access, but might also benefit from, the promising therapy. In these cases, limiting advocacy efforts to advocating for those parties that stand to gain or benefit from the same therapy helps to limit the expectations placed on individual clinicians. But hospitals, and even the professional organisations that individual clinicians may be members of, may also be able to offset an inequity through more efforts in areas such as health reform, policy development, and hospital-wide priority and agenda setting. Although sometimes slow moving, institutional forms of advocacy can help to address inequity at the public health and systems levels.
My intention here is not to quantify or draw precisely demarcate how much advocacy is required, or the degree of auxiliary benefit to others within the healthcare system that must be produced, in order to ethically offset an isolated decision to treat patients inequitably. I am simply claiming that advocating for equity helps to justify a decision that entails present inequity. In the case of local efforts, getting even one additional child enrolled in a study for or compassionate access to a promising experimental therapy may be an ethically sufficient move towards equity. These efforts may not succeed, but if clinicians and public hospitals do not at least try for a more optimal present or future outcome, then it is possible that the inequitable status quo will continue; clinicians and CECs may continue to receive referrals regarding such cases and staff may continue to experience moral distress as a result of failing to treat patients fairly.
The second condition that I will argue must be satisfied in order for medical inequity to be ethically permissible is that inequitable decisions must be exercised in a way that demonstrates respect for affected parties. Respect for persons is a widely accepted ethical principle in medical and research ethics. 28 In clinical research trials, the group of participants receiving standard care (as opposed to a the control group receiving a new therapy) may miss out on the potential benefits associated with the new therapy. In this context, part of demonstrating respect for these participants involves providing them with information regarding the new therapy or with compassionate access to the new therapy at the conclusion of the trial, if there is emerging evidence of the therapy's efficacy and it is desired by those participants. This is one way, in research contexts, of demonstrating respect for persons, particularly to those who are denied possible benefits.
In clinical contexts, respect for persons can be demonstrated in a number of similar ways. First, respect for persons requires openand honest discussion with patients and families-for example, listening to what parents have learned about a therapy, taking this information seriously, openly and honestly discussing the evidence base for that therapy and its current stage of development locally and overseas, clarifying whether it might become available to them and their child in the near future and acknowledging situations of clinical uncertainty or equipoise. Research into a therapy may contribute to knowledge regarding how a drug works or produce evidence of therapeutic benefit. Patients and families may not understand the difference between the use of a therapy for research purposes and clinical purposes, or what the hospital's policy is when an experimental therapy shows therapeutic promise but has not yet been locally approved and subsidised. Open and honest discussion about the relevant therapy can help to build and maintain respectful relationships between clinicians, patients and families.
A second way of demonstrating respect for persons is by acknowledging the inequity. It is not necessarily only the outcome of a decision that is ethically important, but sometimes also how the decision is executed and communicated to those who are affected by it. This requires avoiding 'dismissive' Paretian, or consequentialist, attitudes towards treatment decisions. This type of attitude regards an inequity as unimportant or irrelevant to the decision, or not the job of the care team to address. This dismissive attitude is disrespectful because it fails to acknowledge the impact on affected parties of not being able to access the promising therapy. It could be distressing for some patients to learn that another patient with the same or a similar condition as them has been given access to a therapy that they have not, especially for reasons that are not obviously fair. Should this occur, openly acknowledging patients and families' lived experience is one way of showing respect for them. In much the same way that an apology can sometimes help to make someone to feel respected, some patients and families may find it reassuring to hear that their doctor is aware of and seeking, with the hospital, to address inequities.
Clinicians should not go out of their way to bring injustices or inequities to the attention of patients and families. But, if a patient or family learns that another child in a room down the hall received a new, promising therapy that was not offered to them or their child, then it may be appropriate for clinicians to, in conversations with that patient and their family, acknowledge the inequity and have a frank discussion about the therapy, as suggested above. This is sometimes expressed as the difference between equal treatment and treatment as an equal-the latter of which is what I am trying to capture with the idea of respect for persons here. 29 This second condition also contributes to the ethical permissibility of an inequitable medical decision. Decisions that fail to satisfy this condition may add insult to injury, inflicting on patients and families not only the inequity itself but also the additional disrespect of dismissing the impact of this inequity on these patients. Demonstrating respect for persons one has treated inequitably can be practically challenging, but it is not impossible.
A policy of inequitable treatment of like patients sends the message that the hospital stands for the differential treatment of children based on their family's income; a failure to advocate for more equitable treatment and a dismissive attitude towards the importance of pushing for more equitable access in the future perpetuates an unjust status quo and may be disrespectful, for the reasons I have outlined. In order for the inequitable treatment of patients to be ethically permissible, there must be ethical grounds for the differential treatment of patients. The ability to afford a therapy is not an ethically relevant difference between patients. 30 Part of demonstrating respect for patients who cannot afford a promising, experimental therapy is acknowledging this.
One concern regarding the conditions I have proposed is that, even if these conditions are met, it may still appear unfair to allow one child or patient to benefit but not others, based on purchasing power. I do not wish to deny that such an outcome is unfair. This is why I have not claimed that the inequitable treatment of patients in this context is ethically preferable-only that it is sometimes ethically permissible, where the decision to do so satisfies the two conditions I have outlined. Where possible, clinicians working in public healthcare systems should still strive for equity of access to therapies for all patients with relevantly similar conditions. Three possible outcomes result in these kinds of cases: (1) no one receives the experimental therapy, (2) one patient receives and benefits from the experimental therapy (and others received the local standard of care) or (3) all patients who might benefit from it and would like to try it receive the experimental therapy. The third option is the most preferable, but may not be possible at present. While the second option may be ethically permissible, clinicians and CECs in public hospitals should not lose sight of the bigger goal, which is equitable access for all.
Conclusion
In this paper, I have outlined some problems with appealing solely to the levelling-down objection and Pareto principles to justify inequities in access to promising experimental therapies. Proponents of Paretian reasoning in medical decision making often rely on the levelling-down objection to justify a Paretoimprovement that would entail inequitable access to a given experimental therapy. I have argued that failing to provide a patient with access to a promising experimental therapy is not truly levelling-down since no resource has been taken away from one party for the sake of equality. Rather, one party has not been provided with special treatment or additional benefits above and beyond the local standard of care. However, denying any one, particular child likely therapeutic benefits in the name of equity is also problematic.
I have argued that one way for clinicians and CECs to balance their commitment to beneficence with their commitment to justice in these cases is to make sure that providing a promising experimental therapy to one child based on their ability to pay for it meets two conditions: firstly, doing so must involve advocating for future equity; and secondly, the decision must be exercised in a way that demonstrates respect for other parties who would also benefit from receiving the therapy but who will not receive it. If justice or equity is compromised by a decision, then there must be a good justification for doing so. This justification should be based on immediate and future benefit to patients, and the hospital should try to offset the potential harmful effects of the inequity by advocating for patients, communicating openly and honestly with patients and families who may be affected, and avoiding disrespectfully dismissive attitudes towards the decision. Taking these extra ethical steps can help to make a treatment decision that involves inequitable access to a promising experimental therapy ethically permissible.
